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A HUMAN FACE TO INSTREAM FLOW: INDIGENOUS
RIGHTS TO WATER FOR SALMON AND FISHERIES
Paul Stanton Kibel*
ABSTRACT
In the United States and throughout the world, there are many indigenous
peoples whose culture and identity are closely connected to salmon and
fisheries. Such salmon and fisheries are often dependent on maintaining
adequate instream flows of water in rivers. Indigenous groups in the United
States and in other countries have increasingly relied on indigenous human
rights laws as a basis to keep water instream to maintain salmon and fisheries.
This includes reliance on sources of international law such as the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights, the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the International Labor Organization’s
Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, the Declaration of Principles for
the Defense of Indigenous Nations and Peoples in the Western Hemisphere and
the Indigenous Peoples Water Declaration. This Article examines five case
studies of how indigenous communities have attempted to use domestic and
international law to ensure that there is adequate flowing water to sustain the
fisheries upon which their tribal cultures depend. Three of these case studies
come from the United States—the Columbia River Basin in the Pacific
Northwest, the Nooksack River in Washington, and Stanshaw Creek in
California—and the other two case studies come from the Saru River in Japan
and the Whanganui River in New Zealand. Collectively, these case studies reveal
that efforts to maintain instream flow are not only about preserving fish stocks
and riverine ecosystems but can also be about preserving cultures.

*
Professor at Golden Gate University School of Law and Visiting Professor at University of California
at Berkeley School of Law. He is also natural resource counsel to the Water and Power Law Group. This Article
developed from the author’s research in Japan’s Hokkaido region in the summer of 2019, and his representation
of Klamath Riverkeeper in the California State Water Board hearings on Stanshaw Creek. He holds a B.A. from
Colgate University in New York and an L.L.M from Boalt Hall School of Law at the University of California at
Berkeley. This Article expands on a chapter in Professor Kibel’s book Riverflow: The Right to Keep Water
Instream (publication forthcoming in 2021 by Cambridge University Press). The Article often contains longer
original quotes rather than shorter quotes accompanied by the author’s summary or citations to more extensive
quotes. This approach was taken because, given the content of the Article, the author determined it was important
to let native/indigenous sources speak directly for themselves in their own words to the fullest extent possible.
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INTRODUCTION: SACRED SALMON
There are multiple sources of state, federal, and international law that
establish legal obligations to keep sufficient water instream for salmon and other
fisheries.

For example, at the state level in California, public trust law recognizes
navigable surface waters and fisheries (including salmon) as public trust
resources, and provides that state and local governments have an obligation
to fully protect such public trust resources whenever feasible.1 With fisheries
located in rivers, streams and creeks, ensuring adequate instream flow is
often needed to provide such full protection.2 At the federal level, the
Endangered Species Act in the United States provides for the designation
and protection of critical habitats for all listed species.3 For many listed fish
species, maintaining such critical habitats often requires maintaining
adequate instream flows.4 Finally, under international law, Article 20 of the
U.N. Convention on the Law of Non-Navigable Uses of International
Watercourses provides “[w]atercourse States shall, individually and, where
appropriate, jointly, protect and preserve the ecosystems of international
watercourses.”5 Adequate instream flows are often essential to protecting
and preserving the ecosystems of watercourses upon which fisheries rely.6
These sources of state, federal, and international law, however, have
generally not framed the obligation to provide adequate instream flows as a
fundamental human right. When viewed through the lens of indigenous rights,
however, we can start to discern the basis for a human right to keep water
instream for fish. This may be particularly true when it comes to instream flows
needed to sustain salmon. Throughout the world, there are many indigenous
cultures in which salmon are central and essential to tribal identity and health,
and in which salmon restoration and instream flows are being sought as
indigenous rights.7

1

Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 718–19, 732 (Cal. 1983).
Katheryn A. Bilodeau, The Elusive Implied Water Right for Fish, 48 IDAHO L. REV. 515, 516 (2012).
3
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544.
4
Bilodeau, supra note 2.
5
G.A. Res. 51/229, at 10, Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses (July 8, 1997).
6
Bilodeau, supra note 2.
7
KATRINE BARBER, DEATH OF CELILO FALLS 24 (2005).
2
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For instance, in Siberia and the Russian Far East, the Itelmen ethnic group
on the Kamchatka Peninsula petitioned the Government of Kamchatka and the
federal fishing agency to protect indigenous salmon fishing rights.8
As another example, in British Columbia in Canada, First Nations on the
west coast of Vancouver Island have banded together to form the Nuu-chahnulth Salmon Alliance to press the provincial and federal Canadian governments
to strengthen protection of salmon stocks from logging operations that degrade
spawning waters.9
As a final illustration of the connection between indigenous rights to water
and fisheries (although not salmon-specific), in northern Mexico, the Cucapá
indigenous people have been reduced from several thousand to a few hundred
persons, as the Colorado River Delta (where the Colorado River flows into the
Sea of Cortez) upon which they rely, has dried up due to upstream diversions.10
In 2002, a complaint was filed with the Mexican National Human Rights
Commission alleging that the failure to preserve flows and fisheries in the
Colorado River Delta violated the rights of the Cucapá under International Labor
Organization Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of 1989
(“I.L.O. No. 169”).11 In its decision on this complaint, the Mexican National
Human Rights Commission ordered Mexico’s federal natural resource agency
to update the biosphere reserve management plan for the Colorado River Delta
to help ensure that the cultural, ecological, and economic needs of the Cucapá
people were better protected.12
This Article examines five case studies of how indigenous communities have
attempted to use state, federal, and international law to ensure that there is
adequate flowing water to sustain the fisheries upon which their tribal cultures
depend. Three of these case studies come from the United States—the Columbia
River Basin in the Pacific Northwest, the Nooksack River in Washington, and
8

David Quammen, Where the Salmon Rule, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, Aug. 2009, at 28.
Judith Lavoie, Bringing Back the Trees to Bring Back the Salmon, NARWHAL (Mar. 13, 2019),
https://thenarwhal.ca/bringing-back-the-trees-to-bring-back-the-salmon; Megan Thomas, Old-Growth Logging
Threatens Culture, Says Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council, CBC NEWS (Nov. 10, 2018), https://www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/british-columbia/old-growth-logging-threatens-culture-says-nuu-chah-nulth-tribal-council-1.4899547;
Nora O’Malley, Outcry for Wild Salmon Builds in Tofino, TOFINO-UCLUELET WESTERLY NEWS (July 4, 2019),
https://www.westerlynews.ca/news/outcry-for-wild-salmon-builds-in-tofino.
10
David H. Getches, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Water under International Norms, 16 COLO. J. INT’L
ENV’T L. & POL’Y 259, 283–84 (2005).
11
Id. at 284; Recomendación sobre el Caso de los habitantes de la Comunidad Indígena Cucapá, 1, Diario
Oficial de law Federación [DOF], 19-4-2002 (Mex.).
12
Getches, supra note 10, at 284; Recomendación sobre el Caso de los habitantes de la Comunidad
Indígena Cucapá, supra note 11.
9
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Stanshaw Creek in California—and the other two case studies come from the
Saru River in Japan and the Whanganui River in New Zealand. In these case
studies, we see both the past shortcomings of efforts to ground the right to fish
and water in indigenous rights, as well as the potential for such efforts going
forward.
CASE STUDIES OF INDIGENOUS CLAIMS TO INSTREAM FLOW TO SUSTAIN
SALMON AND FISHERIES

I.

A. Yakima Fishing Rights and Celilo Falls on the Columbia River
This first case study considers the ways that national governments may be
more willing to protect the indigenous right to fisheries from actions by third
parties than actions by the national government itself.
Celilo Falls was located on the Oregon side of the Columbia River near the
town The Dalles, east of the city of Portland.13 According to author Katrine
Barber in her 2005 book Death of Celilo Falls “[r]apid currents and exposed
rocks created a navigational nightmare. The rapids, backwaters, and eddies also
constituted what many considered the best nine-mile stretch of fishing sites on
the continent.”14
Barber further elaborated on how the Indians managed to fish for salmon on
this navigational nightmare:
When salmon migrated, fishers waited on scaffolds that hung from
cliffs above the roaring water of the falls or on platforms that reached
out over the river like pointed fingers. From these cantilevers, Indians
lowered mobile and stationary nets deep into the water where millions
of salmon forced their way up the river. The rushing current pushed
fish backward, stunning them and allowing Indians to skillfully scoop
up the fish[.]15

The Native American (Indian) tribes that traditionally fished at Celilo Falls
included the Yakima, Umatilla, Warm Springs, Wasco, and Wishram.16 For
these tribes, salmon represented the essential connection between human

13

BARBER, supra note 7, at 14, 19.
Id. at 19.
15
Id. at 23.
16
Id. at 38; Bruce Rigsby, The Stevens Treaties, Indian Claims Commission Docket 264, and the Ancient
One Known as Kennewick Man, in THE POWER OF PROMISES: RETHINKING INDIAN TREATIES IN THE PACIFIC
NORTHWEST 244, 244–45, 252–53 (Alexandra Harmon ed., 2008).
14
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cultures and the natural world.17 This connection was evidenced by the First
Salmon Ceremony common among the salmon-dependent Columbia River
Basin tribes, when the return of spring salmon runs marked the end of winter
and meals of dried foods.18
In 1855, the United States entered into a series of treaties with Pacific
Northwest tribes, including the Yakima and the Umatilla, in the Columbia River
Basin.19 These treaties became known as the Stevens Treaties, named after
Territorial Governor Isaac Stevens who negotiated them on behalf of the United
States.20 The 1855 Stevens Treaties with the Yakima and the Umatilla provided
that the tribes retained “the right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed
places, in common with all citizens of the Territory.”21 The term “Territory”
referred to the Oregon Territory because in 1855, Oregon, Washington, and
Idaho had not yet been admitted as new states to the United States.22
Over the course of the century that followed the Stevens Treaties, the
Yakima were often successful in defending their fishing rights in the courts.23
Often represented by the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), which
acted in a trustee capacity in such litigation, the Yakima were able to preserve
their treaty fishing rights against claims by non-Indian fishers in two important
federal court cases.24
In the first case, Seufert Brothers Company v. United States, an Oregon
fishing company attempted to oust the Yakima from access to Celilo Falls on
the southern shore of the Columbia River and restrict the tribe’s fishing to the
northern shore (in Washington state) of the river.25 In its 1919 decision in
Seufert, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the right of the Yakima to fish for
salmon at Celilo Falls and other spots on the Oregon side of the Columbia River,
relying on the “usual and accustomed places” language in the 1855 treaty.26
In the second case, United States v. Earnest Cramer and E.R. Cramer, the
BIA filed suit in federal district court in Portland, Oregon on behalf of the
17

Id. at 24.
Id.
19
Id. at 51–52.
20
See id. at 51; Rigsby, supra note 16, at 244–45, 252–53.
21
BARBER, supra note 7, at 51.
22
Treaty of Oregon, NW. POWER AND CONSERVATION COUNCIL, https://www.nwcouncil.org/reports/
columbia-river-history/treatyoforegon (last visited Aug. 28, 2020).
23
See BARBER, supra note 7, at 52–53.
24
Id. at 36, 39–40, 52–53.
25
Seufert Brothers Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194 (1919); see also BARBER, supra note 7, at 48–49.
26
Seufert Brothers, 249 U.S. at 194.
18
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Yakima in response to non-Indian fishermen that had constructed fishing
scaffolds at Celilo Falls and other traditional Yakima fishing spots along the
Columbia River.27 In his 1946 decision in Cramer, again relying on the
provisions in the 1855 treaty, federal district court judge James Alger Fee found
in favor of the Yakima, granting temporary restraining orders against the
Cramers and ordering the Cramers to remove their fishing scaffolds at that
location.28
The Yakima’s court victories in the Seufert and Cramer cases, however,
would soon be erased by the plans of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to build
a new dam (“The Dalles Dam”) on the Columbia River.29 The reservoir behind
The Dalles Dam, to be named Celilo Lake (strangely to commemorate the spot
the dam would flood and bury), would inundate Celilo Falls and cover it with
slack water.30 Moreover, the dam would block the upstream passage of salmon
returning to the spot where Celilo Falls had been located.31 The economic
justifications given for The Dalles Dam were hydroelectric power, flood control
and improved river navigation.32 The Army Corps of Engineers offered the
Yakima and other tribes monetary settlements for their lost fishing rights and
lost fishing income resulting from the inundation of Celilo Falls.33
At the 1951 Appropriations Committee Hearing for the U.S. House of
Representatives, Thomas Yallup (attorney for the Yakima) presented testimony
emphasizing the religious importance of Celilo Falls to the tribe, explaining that
“fishing at the falls water is held to be sacred to the Indians” and describing
Celilo Falls as a site where Indians caught “sacred fish” for “their customary
religious practices, which have been practiced for centuries and are protected
now.”34 During the hearing, when a congressman asked Yallup if another site on
the Columbia River could provide the Yakima with a substitute for Celilo Falls,
Yallup responded that an alternate site “would not be a substitute to our
beliefs.”35
When Congress approved the funds to construct The Dalles Dam in 1953,
the Yakima (in a final attempt to save Celilo Falls) requested that Congress
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

BARBER, supra note 7, at 58–59.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 4, 14–15.
Id. at 87.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 155–56.
Id. at 83.
Id.
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consider relocating the dam thirteen miles upriver from its proposed location.36
In support of the relocation alternative, Thomas Yallup argued that the dam
should be built “at some other place, rather than destroy the place which we have
held sacred[.]”37 The proposal for an alternative dam location, however, was
never given serious consideration by the Army Corps of Engineers and
Congress.38 The Dalles Dam was constructed in its originally proposed location
and Celilo Falls was drowned by the rising waters of Lake Celilo.39
As author Katrine Barber observed:
Although the federal government defended local Indians when the
states of Oregon and Washington threatened their rights, it was the
federal government itself that struck the crucial blow against Native
fishing in the region. Through the authorization of the dams, Congress
decided that the Indians did not have a superior right to fish the
Columbia when that right competed with economic progress. . . . What
did it matter if Indians retained the right to fish in “usual and
accustomed” places if those places (and the fish themselves) could not
survive regional progress?40

In her book, Barber offers this account of the how local Native Americans
experienced the celebrations that accompanied the completion of The Dallas
Dam in 1957:
Celebrations and commemorations reveal what people consider
important. As these celebrations suggest, most non-Indian people
hailed The Dalles Dam as progress. The ceremonies that accompanied
the various phases of construction celebrated a remade river, a
“highway” upon which goods transported to and from The Dalles
would be accompanied by the hum of electrical generators. In contrast,
the region’s Indians mourned the loss of fishing sites and a core way
of life. Rosita Wellsey remembered that as a child she watched the
floodwaters behind the dam inundate Celilo: “As the little islands
disappeared, I could see my grandmother trembling, like something
was hitting her . . . she just put out her hand and she started to cry.”41

In the Seufert and Cramer cases, the BIA and the federal courts both stepped
in to honor the federal government’s trustee obligations to the Yakima and
preserve the tribe’s fishing rights from encroachment by third parties. When it
36
37
38
39
40
41

Id. at 89.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 5–6.
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came to federal dam building, however, the federal government was all too ready
to set aside its trustee obligations to tribes for what it perceived as more
paramount economic and political interests.42 The fish passage and flowing
water needed to sustain Yakima salmon fishing rights were sacrificed to
prioritize the navigation-based commerce and hydroelectric generation in the
Columbia River Basin.
B. Ainu Human Rights and Nibutani Dam on the Saru River in Japan
This second study focuses on how constitutional rights and international
human rights law can inform national courts’ approach to indigenous rights to
water and fisheries. The study also focuses on the inadequacy of the remedies
provided by these national courts for such constitutional and international law
rights violations.
The Saru River is located in the Hokkaido District in northern Japan.43 The
capital of the Hokkaido District is the city of Sapporo.44 The Ainu ethnic people
that live along and near the Saru River consider themselves ethnically and
culturally distinct from the Japanese.45 A study conducted in 1995 indicated that
seventy percent of residents in the area near the town of Nibutani were Ainu.46
In the traditional Ainu language, the word for salmon is shiepe, which also
means staple food.47 Salmon is a critical source of food for the Ainu people, and
a critical part of Ainu culture in terms of harvest and preparation methods and
dining rituals.48 This historical treatment of the Ainu by the Japanese has been
brutal, with particular efforts by the Japanese to break the Ainu people’s
connection to salmon and salmon fishing.49
In a 1997 decision by the Sapporo District Court (discussed in more detail
below), the following findings were made:
In 1873 . . . the use of uray nets (i.e., catching fish by placing stakes
across a river to bar the fish from traveling up except for at a single
open space where nets are set), one of the traditional Ainu fishing

42

See id. at 63.
Mark A. Levin, Japan: Kayano et al. v. Hokkaido Expropriation Committee: ‘The Nibutani Dam
Decision’, 38 I.L.M. 394, 400 (1999).
44
Sapporo, JAPANGUIDE.COM, japan-guide.com.
45
Levin, supra note 43, at 395–96.
46
Id. at 410.
47
Id. at 411.
48
Id.
49
See id. at 422.
43
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methods, was prohibited for salmon fishing at the Toyohira, Hassamu,
Kotani, and Shinoro Rivers. . . . In 1878, fishing for salmon and trout
was banned entirely for all rivers around Sapporo. . . . Thereafter,
poaching salmon in the rivers of the Chitose area was prohibited. And
after the traditional Ainu fishing method by tesu nets was prohibited,
salmon and trout fishing even for personal household consumption
was prohibited in 1897. . . . Putting the above-recognized facts together
with the overall purport of the arguments submitted, we further find as
follows: Because their livelihood had been sustained principally by
fishing, the above-described prohibitions of fisheries, etc. plunged the
Ainu people into destitution. . . . To say that those policies failed to
consider the Ainu people’s unique dietary customs, manners and
customs, language, etc. is unavoidable. And the deterioration of the
Ainu people’s unique manners and customs, language, etc. was a direct
consequence thereof.50

The Court further took the time in its decision to consider the significance
of these rights to Ainu culture:
The fundamental characteristics of Ainu culture are focused around
hunting, gathering, and fishing, spending their lives together with
nature. Because this culture was born from worshiping the bounty of
nature together with their gods, the culture’s notion of nature bonds
together an area’s culture with the land cherished by that culture in a
connection so extraordinarily close that it can never be severed.51

In 1986, the Hokkaido Development Bureau approved the construction of
the Nibutani Dam on the Saru River.52 The proposed new dam did not provide
for upstream or downstream passage of salmon, and the reservoir behind the
dam, Lake Nibutani, would result in the inundation of several sacred Ainu sites
including Poromoy Chashi, situated on a flat riverside terrace.53 The Hokkaido
Development Bureau approved Nibutani Dam without consultations with the
Ainu.54
In an effort to preserve salmon runs on the Saru River as well as sacred sites
such as Poromoy Chashi, in 1997 a lawsuit was decided in Sapporo District
Court against the Hokkaido Appropriations Committee for two Ainu residents,
Kiazawa Tadashi and Kayano Shigeru, whose property had been confiscated to

50
51
52
53
54

Id. at 422–23.
Id. at 424 (brackets omitted).
See id. at 400–01.
Id. at 410, 412–13, 415–16.
See id. at 401.
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make way for Nibutani Dam and the reservoir behind it.55 Plaintiffs Kiazawa
and Kayano relied on two main legal sources in support of their claim that the
approval and construction of the dam violated the rights of the Ainu.56
First, Kiazawa and Kayano alleged that the approval and construction of
Nibutani Dam violated Article 13 of the Japanese Constitution. Article 13
provides: “All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere
with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other
governmental affairs.”57
Second, Kiazawa and Kayano further alleged that the approval and
construction of Nibutani Dam had violated the 1966 United Nations
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which the
Japanese Parliament ratified in 1979.58 Article 27 of the ICCPR provides, “[i]n
those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and
practice their own religion, or to use their own language.”59
Thus, unlike with the salmon-related claims of the Yakima in the United
States, the Ainu claims to preserve salmon were not grounded in treaties with
the national government that recognized fishing rights. Rather, the legal claims
of the Ainu, in the lawsuit filed by Kiazawa and Kayano, were grounded in
human rights and indigenous rights law set forth in a domestic constitution and
an international treaty.
In a statement submitted to the court, plaintiff Kayano Shigeru recounted his
own experiences and those of his father in regard to the Saru River and salmon:
My father was detained on a charge of fishing salmon by the Japanese
police when I was a little child. A Japanese rule prohibiting salmon
fishing by the Ainu, who had relied upon salmon as their staple, meant
death to the Ainu. . . . Hokkaido was inhabited by Ainu people before
the Japanese invasion. Every stream and swamp, in addition to the
mountains and rivers, is named using the Ainu language. . . . [T]he
Ainu have 15 ways of fishing salmon and more than 30 ways of
55

See id. at 394, 398–99.
See id.
57
Id. at 418 (quoting NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 13).
58
See Levin, supra note 43, at 417–18.
59
Id. at 417 (quoting International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, Dec. 19, 1966, 6 I.L.M.
368, 999 U.N.T.S. 171).
56
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cooking it. I wish the Japanese Government [would] let the Ainu have
the right to fish salmon again.60

In terms of the claims under Article 13 of the Japanese Constitution, the
Sapporo District Court found:
Diversity exists in an unmistakable fashion as the respective
differences in the particulars faced by each individual. . . . Premised
upon this diversity and these differences, Article 13 demands
meaningful, not superficial, respect for individuals and the differences
arising between them. . . . If we look at these points in terms of the
relationship between a dominant majority and a minority who do not
belong to the majority, it often happens that the majority people, being
a majority, consequently tend to ignore or forget the interests of the
minority. . . . The minority’s distinct ethnic culture is an essential
commodity to sustain its ethnicity without being assimilated into the
majority. And thus, it must be said that for the individuals who belong
to an ethnic group, the right to enjoy their distinct ethnic culture is a
right that is needed for their self-survival as a person. . . . Accordingly,
we agree that Constitution Art. 13 guarantees to the plaintiffs’ the right
to enjoy the distinct ethnic culture of the Ainu people, which is the
minority to which the plaintiffs belong.61

In terms of the claims under Article 27 of the ICCPR, the Sapporo District
Court determined:
It is proper to understand that the ICCPR, as set out above, guarantees
to individuals belonging to a minority the right to enjoy that minority’s
distinct culture. Together with this, there is an obligation [sekimu]
imposed upon all contracting nations to exercise due care with regard
to this guarantee when deciding upon, or executing, national policies
which have the risk of adversely affecting a minority’s culture, etc.
Thus, the Ainu people, as a minority which has preserved the
uniqueness of its culture, are guaranteed the right to enjoy their culture
by ICCPR Art. 27, and accordingly, it must be said that . . . our nation
has a duty [gimu] to faithfully observe this guarantee. . . . Indeed, the
rights arising under ICCPR Art. 27, are not unlimited. . . . But in light
of the aims of ICCPR Art. 27, any limits on the guarantee of rights
must be kept to the narrowest degree necessary.62

Building on these interpretations of Article 13 of the Japanese Constitution
and Article 27 of the ICCPR, the Sapporo District Court went on to hold:
60
Hiroshi Maruyama, Ainu Landowners’ Struggle for Justice and the Illegitimacy of the Nibutani Dam
Project in Hokkaido Japan, 14 INT’L COMM. L. REV. 63 (2012).
61
Levin, supra note 43, at 418–19.
62
Id. at 418.
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Of course, it is conceivable that these various values may be
compromised for the public interest. But in cases where such
concessions are to be sought, there must also be the greatest degree
of consideration that includes a sense of remorse concerning matters
such as that described above of the historical background of the
coerced deterioration of the Ainu people’s unique ethnic culture
caused by assimilationist policies. . . . Absent such remorseful
consideration, what results is the thoughtless theft of nature,
including land in an indigenous region that is deeply connected to a
distinct ethnic culture. . . . Of course, there is absolutely no bar on
using land originally issued pursuant to the Hokkaido Former
Aboriginals Protection Act for the public interest, but here too, the
greatest degree of consideration seems warranted. If such
consideration is lacking, it reflects the majority’s careless and selfish
policymaking, and our judgment finding illegality cannot be
avoided.63

The Court then finally concluded with its final decision:
Taking all that has been written above together, we find that the
Minister of Construction, who was the authorizing agency and the
agent for the enterprise authority in the instant matter, neglected the
investigative and research procedures that were necessary to judge the
priority of the competing interests accompanying the accomplishment
of the Project Plan. He unreasonably made little of and ignored various
factors and values that should have been given the highest regard. . . .
Therefore, we conclude that the instant Project Authorization was in
violation of [the] Land Expropriation Law Article 20(3) and that such
illegality succeeded to the Confiscatory Administrative Rulings.64

When it came time to fashioning a remedy, however, notwithstanding that it
found the approval of Nibutani Dam to be unlawful, the Sapporo District Court
was unwilling to halt construction or order the dam’s removal.65 In its ruling, the
Court stated “with the Nibutani Dam already complete and filling with water,
we are forced to recognize the extraordinary harm to the public interest that
would arise from reversing the Confiscatory Administrative Rulings.”66 The
plaintiffs Kiazawa and Kayano, and the Ainu people, were left with a strong
proclamation of illegality but were provided no injunctive relief.67
63
64
65
66
67

Id. at 425–26.
Id. at 427.
See id. at 428–29.
Id. at 429.
See id. at 396, 398, 429.
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As author Georgia Stevens reflected in her 2004 article titled More than
Paper: Protecting Ainu Culture and Influencing Japanese Dam Development:
The ultimate outcome of the case, however, rendered the legal content
of Article 27 and the constitutional protections as mere rhetoric. While
the court held that the administrative decisions to expropriate Ainu
land and approve the dam project were illegal, it would not reverse the
all-but-complete dam construction.
Instead, the plaintiffs were denied substantive relief on the basis that
considerations of “public interest” dictated that the dam should be
completed. And so the dam remains.68

Yet the completion of Nibutani Dam and the 1997 Sapporo District Court
decision are not the end of the story. In part as a result of international media
coverage of the Ainu-Nibutani Dam controversy and other indigenous-natural
resource conflicts around the world, in 2007 the United Nations General
Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“U.N.
Declaration”).69 The U.N. Declaration included provisions that speak to
situations where indigenous groups have deep cultural ties to fishery resources
and the instream flows such fishery resources need. Article 25 of the U.N.
Declaration provides: “Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and
strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned
or otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and
other resources and to uphold their responsibilities to future generations in this
regard.”70 Article 26 of the U.N. Declaration provides:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and
resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise
used or acquired.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control
the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of
traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as
those which they have otherwise acquired.
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands,
territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due

68
Georgia Stevens, More Than Paper: Protecting Ainu Culture and Influencing Japanese Dam
Development, CULTURAL SURVIVAL (Dec. 2004), https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survivalquarterly/more-paper-protecting-ainu-culture-and-influencing.
69
See G.A. Res. 61/295, annex, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept.
13, 2007).
70
Id. art. 25 (emphasis added).
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respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the
indigenous peoples concerned.71

In June 2008, a year after the adoption of The U.N. Declaration, the Japanese
Diet officially designated the Ainu as an indigenous people of the northern part
of Japan and, in particular, of Hokkaido.72 Based on this designation, the
Japanese Government established a high-level panel of experts on Ainu affairs
that resulted in funding for local investigations and research to document and
preserve Ainu culture and language.73 Therefore, although the Ainu were unable
to stop the construction of Nibutani Dam, the litigation the Ainu brought
concerning the dam helped set political events in motion that may better secure
the legal status of the Ainu people.74
From the perspective of U.S. jurisprudence, regardless of the ultimate
outcome of the litigation challenging Nibutani Dam, it is interesting to note the
willingness of the Sapporo District Court to rely directly on sources of
international law, such as provisions of the 1966 United Nations International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.75 In U.S. courts, for reasons that are
beyond the scope of this Article, there has often been reluctance to rely on
international law to support domestic judicial decisions.76 As Patrick McFadden
noted in his article titled Provincialism in United States Courts:
Over the past 200 years, United States judges have developed a series
of rules and practices that minimize the role of international law in
domestic litigation. Considered collectively, these rules and practices
embody a thoroughgoing, deeply rooted provincialism - an
institutional, almost reflexive, animosity toward the application of
international law in U.S. courts. As a consequence, international law
plays almost no part in the judicial business of the United States. It is
rarely discussed in American cases, and almost never provides the rule
of decision upon which the court judgments turn.77

The experience of the Ainu’s legal efforts to protect their rights to water and
salmon therefore also speak to the broader question of the status of international
71

Id. art. 26.
Maruyama, supra note 60, at 63 (discussing the Japanese decision to designate the Ainu people as
indigenous).
73
See id. However, it is also important to note that no progress has been made in guaranteeing Ainu
rights.
74
See id. at 68 (discussing the Nibutani Dam project).
75
See id. at 72 (discussing a decision by the Sapporo district court).
76
See Patrick M. McFadden, Provincialism in United States Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 4, 5 (1995)
(discussing the role of international law in domestic litigation).
77
Id.
72
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indigenous rights law, and international law in general, in domestic courts. Some
nations, such as Japan in the case of the Ainu litigation or Mexico in the case of
the claims brought on behalf of the Cucapá people, have shown a willingness to
ground their domestic court decisions in sources of international human rights
law.78 Other nations, like the United States, however, have often been more
reluctant to do so.79
C. Lummi Fishing Rights and Diversions on the Nooksack River in
Washington
The third case study examines conflicting federal case law in the United
States on the extent to which indigenous fishery rights give rise to an implied
right to maintain the instream flows needed to sustain fisheries, and whether
federally-recognized indigenous fishery and water rights can serve as an impetus
to more robust implementation of state instream flow standards.
The Nooksack River originates in the Cascade Mountains in the State of
Washington. It is comprised of three forks (the North, the South, and the
Middle).80 The Nooksack River empties into northern Puget Sound near the city
of Bellingham.81 “Historically, the Nooksack River produced multiple runs of
salmon annually, including both spring and fall Chinook (King), Coho (silver),
Chum (Dog), and, in odd-numbered years, Pink (Humpback) salmon.”82 All of
these salmon species are anadromous; the fish hatch and spend a portion of their
lives in fresh water but then migrate to the sea to mature, returning to their fresh
water natal streams to spawn.83
The Lummi Reservation along the Nooksack River was established pursuant
to the 1855 Treaty of Point Elliot, one of the series of Stevens Treaties discussed
in Section I.A. on Yakima rights to fish and water on the Columbia River.84 Like
most Stevens Treaties, in addition to providing for lands set aside to create a
reservation, the Treaty of Point Elliot also guaranteed the Lummi “the right of

78

See Getches, supra note 10, at 283–85.
See McFadden, supra note 76, at 5 (discussing the role of international law in domestic litigation).
80
Letter from Clifford Cultee, Chairman, Lummi Indian Bus. Council, to Ken Salazar, Sec’y of the U.S.
Dep’t of the Interior, and Larry Echo Hawk, Assistant Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of the Interior for Indian Affs.
(June 6, 2011) (https://www.lummi-nsn.gov/userfiles/90_Lummi%20Nation%20Litigation%20Request%206.7.
11.pdf).
81
See id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
See id.
79
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taking fish at usual and accustomed [places].”85 This right is sometimes referred
to as an off-reservation fishing right or an aboriginal fishing right since it is not
limited to fishing at places located on reservation lands.86
Pursuant to a 1952 piece of federal legislation known as the McCarran
Amendment, the recognition and quantification of Indian water rights could
initially be determined by state courts, subject to the potential review by the U.S.
Supreme Court (if it chose to grant review of the state supreme court ruling).87
Pursuant to the McCarran Amendment, the State of Washington has the
authority to undertake an adjudication of water rights in the Nooksack River
basin (including an adjudication of Lummi water rights derived from the fishing
rights in the Treaty of Point Elliott), but to date the State of Washington has not
undertaken such an adjudication.88 The unadjudicated status of Lummi fishing
and water rights has therefore left the Lummi Nation so far without an effective
forum to defend and enforce its fishing rights from the impacts of excessive
diversions of Nooksack River water by non-Indian parties.89
In 1985, in an effort to respond to concerns raised by the Lummi Nation and
others about excessive Nooksack River diversions, the State of Washington
established minimum instream flows for the Nooksack River.90 However, since
the Nooksack River instream flows were established, there has been limited
efforts by the State of Washington to actually enforce these instream flow
standards by curtailing existing diversions.91
Due to frustration with the failure of the State of Washington to initiate an
adjudication of water rights for the Nooksack River, and Washington’s weak
enforcement of instream flow standards for the Nooksack River, in May 2011,
the Lummi Indian Business Council adopted Resolution #2011-078
(Resolution).92 This Resolution provided:
WHEREAS, the Lummi people have fished in the Nooksack River
and the waters of northern Puget Sound since time immemorial.
85

Id.
See id.
87
See The McCarran Amendment, 32 U.S.C. § 666 (1952).
88
See id; Letter from Clifford Cultee to Ken Salazar and Larry Echo Hawk, supra note 80.
89
See Letter from Clifford Cultee to Ken Salazar and Larry Echo Hawk, supra note 80.
90
See Wash. Admin. Code § 173-501-030 (1985); see also Chet Broberg, Northwest Washington Tribe’s
Fight for Salmon and Water 2–4 (unpublished paper for Spring 2020 Water Law seminar at University of
California at Berkeley School of Law) (on file with author).
91
See Letter from Clifford Cultee to Ken Salazar and Larry Echo Hawk, supra note 80; see also Broberg,
supra note 90, at 2–4.
92
Letter from Clifford Cultee to Ken Salazar and Larry Echo Hawk, supra note 80 (attached Resolution
#2011-078 by the Lummi Indian Business Council, adopted on May 17, 2011).
86

KIBEL2_4.8.21

2021]

4/8/2021 4:36 PM

A HUMAN FACE TO INSTREAM FLOW

393

Article V of the Treaty of Point Elliot provides that the “right of taking
fish at usual and accustomed grounds and stations is further secured to
said Indians in common with all citizens of the Territory,” and
WHEREAS, the Lummi Nation retained a federal reserved water right
to instream flows sufficient to support a sustainable, harvestable
surplus of fish to exercise their treaty fishing rights when the
reservation to take fish was made in the Treaty of Point Elliott; and
WHEREAS, at this time, state-permitted water diversions in the
Nooksack River basin threaten the fish species that make up the
Nation’s treaty fishery and the water resources needed to ensure a
permanent, economically viable homeland for the Lummi People; and
....
WHEREAS, federal legal action brought the United States, as trustee
for the Lummi Nation and its trust resources is necessary at this time
in order to ensure protections and preservation of the Nation’s treaty
rights, on and off the Lummi Reservation[.]93

In June 2011, following the adoption of this Resolution, the Lummi Indian
Business Council sent a letter to then Secretary of the U.S. Department of the
Interior (Ken Salazar) and then Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Department of
the Interior for Indian Affairs (Larry Echo Hawk).94 In this June 2011 letter,
which bore the heading Litigation Request by Lummi Indian Business Council
to Protect Lummi Nation Treaty Fishing and Water Rights, the Lummi Indian
Business Council stated:
Since time immemorial, the Lummi Nation and its members have
harvested [salmon] for commercial, subsistence, and ceremonial
purposes.
....
State-permitted water diversions have significantly depleted flows in
the Nooksack River and directly threaten the treaty fishery. Simply
put, fish need water. Low flows resulting from diversions result in
reduced wetted habitat, increased temperatures, and impaired channel
configuration. As flows go down, productive, protective side channels
may become shallow, isolated ponds where fish are trapped. As stream
temperatures rise, oxygen content is reduced and potential for disease
increases. Low flows and reduced habitat area also result in reduced
food supply. Competition for food increases as the same number of

93
94

Id.
Letter from Clifford Cultee to Ken Salazar and Larry Echo Hawk, supra note 80.

KIBEL2_4.8.21

394

4/8/2021 4:36 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

fish is concentrated into a smaller area. Finally, dewatering of streams
can leave salmon eggs dry, exposed, and lifeless.
....
No state adjudication of water rights in the Nooksack basin has ever
been completed and no such adjudication is currently being proposed.
The Nation’s reserved rights can and should be determined without the
necessity of determining the status or validity of any state-based water
rights in the basin.95

In support of their June 2011 request to the U.S. Department of the Interior,
the Lummi Nation relied on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s decisions in the
United States v. Adair litigation.96
In Adair, at issue were water rights to the Williamson River for the Klamath
Indian Tribe.97 The treaty with the Klamath reserved the rights of fishing on the
Tribe’s reservation.98 The Adair Court looked to guidance from the 1908
decision in United States v. Winters,99 in which the U.S. Supreme Court had
found implied water rights based on the underlying purposes of the treaty and
based on its determination that all ambiguities in treaties with Indians should be
resolved in favor of the Indians (because of the circumstances in which the
treaties were negotiated).100 Referring to the treaty language, in Adair the Ninth
Circuit found support for “dual purposes” in the treaty with the Klamath: one
purpose was to maintain the Klamath as an agrarian society; the second purpose
was to ensure that the Klamath could continue to hunt, fish, and gather (to fish
for salmon in this instance).101
Adair held that since one of the primary purposes of the treaty was to entitle
the Klamath to continue its traditional salmon fishing, there must be water to
support the existence of salmon in the river.102 Pursuant to the approach laid out
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Winters, the Ninth Circuit found this gave rise to
an instream water right.103 Without quantifying the extent of the instream flows
necessary to support the Klamath’s fishing rights, in United States v. Adair

95

Id.
Letter from Clifford Cultee to Ken Salazar and Larry Echo Hawk, supra note 80 (citing United States
v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1410-11 (9th Cir. 1983)).
97
United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir. 1983); Bilodeau, supra note 2, at 540.
98
Adair, 723 F.2d at 1414; Bilodeau, supra note 2, at 540–41.
99
Adair, 723 F.2d at 1409; Bilodeau, supra note 2, at 541.
100
Adair, 723 F.2d at 1408; Bilodeau, supra note 2, at 542–43.
101
Adair, 723 F.2d at 1409–10; Bilodeau, supra note 2, at 541.
102
Adair, 723 F.2d at 1415.
103
Id. at 1409, 1415.
96
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(Adair III) the Court clarified that any state-adjudication of this instream water
right (pursuant to the McCarran Amendment) would need to provide
“productive habitat” for salmon.104
However, there are also state court decisions that run counter to Adair, most
notably the Idaho District Court’s 1999 decision in the Snake River Basin
Adjudication (SRBA).105 The SRBA case involved the treaty rights of the Nez
Perce Tribe to the waters of the Snake River, which is tributary to the Columbia
River.106 Like most of the Stevens Treaties, the United States’ 1855 treaty with
the Nez Perce provided the Tribe with the right of “taking fish at all usual and
accustomed places.”107 The fisheries at issue in the SRBA litigation were
salmon.108 Like the Klamath in Adair, the Nez Perce argued that the recognition
of instream waters rights on the Snake River was necessary to the purposes of
upholding treaty-based tribal salmon fishing rights.109
In SRBA, however, the Idaho District Court held that Adair was off point
because Adair involved fishing from water that was on the tribal reservation
rather than fishing at places that were off-reservation.110 Relying on this factual
distinction from Adair, the Idaho District Court refused to recognize that the Nez
Perce’s treaty-based fishing rights at off-reservation locations gave rise to an
implied instream water right.111 In SRBA, the Idaho District Court conceded that
the Nez Perce held certain rights to fish salmon but explained that it was not
prepared to “take the additional leap and by judicial fiat declare a water right for
that purpose.”112
The approach taken by the Idaho court in SRBA has been subject to criticism
by water law and Indian law scholars. In her 2012 law review article titled The
Elusive Implied Water Right for Fish: Do Off-Reservation Instream Water
Rights Exist to Support Indian Treaty Fishing Rights?, Katheryn A. Bilodeau
wrote:

104
United States v. Adair, 187 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1277 (D. Or. 2002) (quoting United States v. Adair
(Adair II), 478 F. Supp. 336, 346 (D. Or. 1979), aff’d, United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983)).
105
See In Re Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA): No. 39576, Consolidated Subcase 03-10022, at 40
(Idaho 5th Jud. Dist. Ct., Nov. 10, 1999), http://www.srba.state.id.us/FORMS/sumjudg.PDF.
106
Id. at 5; Bilodeau, supra note 2, at 524.
107
In Re Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA): No. 39576, Consolidated Subcase 03-10022, at 17, 32
(Idaho 5th Jud. Dist. Ct., Nov. 10, 1999) http://www.srba.state.id.us/FORMS/sumjudg.PDF.
108
Id. at 21.
109
Id. at 28.
110
Id. at 39.
111
Id. at 40.
112
Id. at 33.
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The treaty does not expressly reserve a water right. However, the treaty
did expressly reserve to the Nez Perce the right to take fish in
traditional off-reservation fishing locations. Winters dictates
ambiguities to be resolved in favor of the Indians: ‘[T]he rule should
certainly be applied to determine between two inferences, one of
which would support the purpose of the agreement and the other
impair or defeat it.’ The implication that off-reservation water might
one day be completely diverted from a stream, creating an inhabitable
environment for fish, does not support the purpose of a fishing
right. . . . The ambiguity should have been resolved in favor of the Nez
Perce.113

Similarly, in their 2006 law-review article The Mirage of Indian Reserved
Water Rights and Western Streamflow Restoration in the McCarran Amendment
Era: A Promise Unfulfilled, Professor Michael C. Blumm and his co-authors
David H. Becker and Joshua D. Smith commented:
In short, by authorizing state courts to interpret federally-reserved
water rights, the McCarran Amendment has forced tribes into hostile
forums in which tribes must be prepared to compromise their claims
for streamflows that fully support the purposes of the reserved rights,
perhaps settling for stream improvements that can partially restore
river ecosystems. Although tribal reserved water rights claims may
open the door to discussions about streamflow restoration, in practice
the McCarran Amendment Era has reduced these claims to mere
bargaining chips rather than vehicles for achieving the purpose of
reservations through streamflow restoration.114

Regarding the impact of Adair I and the McCarran Amendments, Blumm,
Becker, and Smith further commented:
Over a quarter-century after the court in Adair I recognized the
Klamath Tribes’ reserved instream flow rights, the Klamath tribes
continue to await the outcome of the state comprehensive adjudication
process in order to obtain [recognition of their reserved water rights.]
Although [Adair] was a critical first step on the road to obtaining “wet
rights” to instream flows, it is quite evident that that was only the first
step in a process which has yet to come to full fruition.115
....

113

Bilodeau, supra note 2, at 542–43.
Michael C. Blumm et al., The Mirage of Indian Reserved Water Rights and Western Streamflow
Restoration in the McCarran Amendment Era: A Promise Unfulfilled, 36 ENV’T L. 1157, 1161 (2006).
115
Id. at 1170.
114
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[In terms of SRBA,] the Nez Perce argued that the treaties implied a
federal right to streamflows necessary to preserve the tribe’s
bargained-for treaty right to fish in the Snake River Basin. Without
such a right, the tribe maintained, its treaty fishing rights would be
virtually meaningless.116

In terms of the Lummi Nation’s efforts to secure instream water rights on
the Nooksack River to give meaning to Lummi people’s treaty-based, salmon
fishing rights, it remains to be seen whether the more expansive approach in
Adair or the more restrictive approach in SRBA will be adopted. Moreover, it
remains to be seen how long this process will take and whether the federal
government is prepared to initiate litigation on behalf of the Lummi Nation to
defend the Lummi people’s rights to fish salmon.
D. Karuk Fishing Rights and Diversions on Stanshaw Creek in California
The fourth case study highlights the interplay between state-law, public-trust
protection (to protect public-trust resources such as fisheries) and federal-law
protections for indigenous rights to fisheries and water.
In northern California, Stanshaw Creek is a tributary to the Klamath River
and traditionally served as an important spawning ground for salmon and
steelhead trout.117 However, as a result of upstream diversions by the Marble
Mountain Ranch, the instream flow in Stanshaw Creek was so depleted that the
creek often lost its connectivity with the downstream Klamath River.118 Most of
the water diverted from Stanshaw Creek was used to operate an antiquated
hydroelectric turbine that provided levels of electricity far in excess of what the
ranch required.119
To address the impacts of these diversions, the enforcement unit of the
California State Water Resources Control Board (“State Water Board”) brought
an administrative action against Marble Mountain Ranch alleging violations of
California public-trust law and California reasonable-use law.120 This
enforcement action, which sought to reduce diversions to provide sufficient
116

Id. at 1197.
Brief for Karuk Tribe & Klamath Riverkeeper at 1, 6–7, Douglas Cole (Cal. State Water Res. Control
Bd. Mar. 29, 2018).
118
Id. at 7–8.
119
Id. at 3, 7–8, 17, 22.
120
CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., ORDER WR 2017-00XX-DWR, ORDER FINDING WASTE,
UNREASONABLE METHOD OF USE, AND UNREASONABLE METHOD OF DIVERSION OF WATER AND ORDERING
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (2016), https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/hearings/
marblemountain/docs/marblemtn_draftorder_083016.pdf.
117
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instream flows to sustain salmon and steelhead populations in Stanshaw Creek
and restore connectivity between Stanshaw Creek and the Klamath River,
culminated in several days of hearings in November 2017 before the State Water
Board.121
Among the parties that participated in the 2017 State Water Board hearings
on the Stanshaw Creek diversions were the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS), the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW), the Karuk
Tribe, and Klamath Riverkeeper.122 The Karuk Tribe’s reservation is located
along the Klamath River (downstream of the confluence of Stanshaw Creek and
the Klamath River).123 Klamath Riverkeeper is a nonprofit conservation
organization focused on protecting and restoring the fisheries and ecosystems in
the Klamath River watershed.124
In addition to presenting live testimony at the 2017 State Water Board
hearings, the Karuk Tribe and Klamath Riverkeeper jointly prepared and
submitted a post-hearing closing brief in March 2018.125 The idea of the Karuk
Tribe and Klamath Riverkeeper to work together to file a joint post-hearing
closing brief, rather than filing separate briefs, came out of the mutual realization
that there was important interplay between the indigenous claims asserted by the
Karuk Tribe and the more traditional environmental claims asserted by Klamath
Riverkeeper.126 As the respective legal counsel for the Karuk Tribe and Klamath
Riverkeeper discussed this interplay following the hearings before the State
Water Board, it seemed like the connections between these different claims
might be more effectively laid out in a joint brief rather than in separate briefs.127
To provide a sense of this interplay, it is worth quoting at length from the
joint post-hearing closing brief filed by the Karuk Tribe and Klamath
Riverkeeper. The brief began by describing the Karuk Tribe and its connection
to Klamath River salmon that traditionally spawned in Stanshaw Creek:

121

Brief for Karuk Tribe & Kalamath Riverkeeper, supra note 117 at 1.
Transcript of Hearing at 13, Douglas Cole (Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd. Nov. 13, 2017), https://
www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/hearings/marblemountain/docs/mmr_transcript11
13.pdf.
123
KARUK TRIBE DEP’T OF NAT. RES. WATER QUALITY ASSESSMENT REP., at 6 (2013), https://kbifrm.
psmfc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Karuk-Tribe_2013_0397_WQAR.pdf.
124
Klamath Riverkeeper, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/klamathriverkeeper/?ref=page_internal.
125
Brief for Karuk Tribe & Klamath Riverkeeper, supra note 117 at 1.
126
Recollections of author Paul Kibel, who participated directly in SWRCB Stanshaw Creek hearing and
related conversations with legal counsel for the Karuk Tribe.
127
Id.
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KIBEL2_4.8.21

2021]

4/8/2021 4:36 PM

A HUMAN FACE TO INSTREAM FLOW

399

With over 3,600 members, the Karuk Tribe is the second largest
federally recognized Indian Tribe in California. The Klamath River is
the lifeblood of the Karuk people. Salmonids, including Chinook
salmon, federally-protected Coho salmon, and steelhead, are essential
to the health and well-being of the Karuk Tribe. As Leaf Hillman,
Director of the Karuk Department of Natural Resources and cultural
leader stated: “[W]e consider ourselves as salmon people, as salmon
has been one of our primary subsistence foods for countless
generations . . . in the place where we have our aboriginal roots, so we
say from time immemorial.” The importance of salmon to the Karuk
people continues today, even though the resource is in decline and is
nearly decimated by over 165 years of resource extraction and dams
and diversions since the Klamath gold rush era.128

Mr. Hillman further testified that:
“[N]ot only . . . have [we] relied on [salmon in] the past, but we
continue to rely on [salmon] to the extent that [they] still persist in the
Basin. We continue to rely on salmon for not only our subsistence use,
but also salmon have been used in our ceremonies as well as our basic
identity is tied very closely to the salmon. And we consider salmon to
be a very close relative of ours and therefore are obliged to take care
of them much as we are obliged to take care of our relations; human
relations as well as our nonhuman relations.” The decline of salmon
has immeasurable negative impacts on the Karuk people.129

After laying out the tribal perspective on restoring Klamath River basin
salmon and restoring Stanshaw Creek instream flows, the joint post-hearing
closing brief then provided more detail regarding alleged violations of California
public-trust law and what remedy was needed to correct these violations:
The public trust doctrine establishes that the waters and wildlife
of the state belong to the people, and that the state acts as a trustee to
manage and protect these resources and their associated public uses for
its peoples’ benefit. The purpose of the public trust “evolve[s] in
tandem with the changing public perception of the values and uses of
waterways.” The public trust doctrine applies to constrain the
extraction of water from navigable waters that impacts navigation and
other public interests, such as the right to fish, bathe, swim, and use
for recreation. Ecological values are among those values protected by
the public trust.
As the state agencies responsible for administering California’s
water resources, including allocation of recycled water, the public trust
128
129

Brief for Karuk Tribe & Klamath Riverkeeper, supra note 117, at 3–4 (citations and brackets omitted).
Id. (citations and brackets omitted).
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doctrine imposes on the State Board an affirmative duty to take the
public trust into account in the planning and allocation of those
resources, and to protect impacted public trust uses whenever feasible.
This is a continuing duty, and includes the obligation to reconsider
terms and conditions of past orders, decisions, or water allocations to
protect public trust resources.130

In terms of the particular conditions on Stanshaw Creek, and a proposed
remedy to address these alleged public trust law violations, the joint post-hearing
closing brief stated:
The Karuk Tribe, the NMFS, CDFW, and the Regional [Water]
Board agree that the [Marble Mountain Ranch] diversion has
significant deleterious impacts on Stanshaw Creek and the salmon and
steelhead that depend on it. There are no other diversions that cause
the severe negative impacts on public trust beneficial uses the creek
provides. Mr. Soto, biologist for the Karuk Tribe, confirmed that
dewatering of Stanshaw Creek in summer months resulted in killing
of juvenile Coho salmon.
As a result of the [Marble Mountain Ranch] diversion in spring,
summer and fall, Stanshaw Creek is nearly dewatered, and the coldwater pool adjacent to the Klamath River loses its ecological
functionality. According to Mr. Soto, as well as fishery experts from
NMFS and CDFW, the most significant problems created by the
Stanshaw Creek diversion are two-fold: “First, fish are excluded from
Stanshaw Creek’s thermal refuge when low flows fail to connect the
creek to the river. As a result[,] these salmon are forced to seek refuge
in other locations further upstream or downstream which extends their
exposure to lethally warm conditions. Second, the fish residing in the
refuge pool are trapped and unable to migrate away from harmful
conditions or predators.” Fish require regular connectivity between the
pond and the Klamath River to ensure they are able to avoid these
problems, which occur at different points in time. Mr. Soto, as well as
experts from NMFS and CDFW, testified that limiting the [Marble
Mountain Ranch] diversion to ensure that 90% of the flow was
permitted to bypass the diversion structure, and maintaining a
minimum flow of at least 2 cfs below the diversion[.]131

In their March 2018 joint brief, the Karuk Tribe and Klamath Riverkeeper
then offered the following account of the ways in which tribal fishing rights and
California public trust law dovetail and inform each other:
130
Id. at 11 (citing Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal. 3d 419, 434–37, 441–49; Cal.
Const., art. X, § 5; Cal. Const., art. I, § 25.).
131
Id. at 8 (citation omitted).
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Protecting public trust beneficial uses in the Klamath River Basin will
protect and preserve the Karuk Tribe’s culture and spiritual and
physical health. The Klamath River salmon, including those that use
Stanshaw Creek, are both a public trust resource and a tribal trust
resource, which means the United States government has an obligation
to protect these resources for the benefit of the Karuk Tribe.132

As of the publication of this Article, the State Water Board of California has
yet to render its decision in the Stanshaw Creek diversion hearing. It therefore
remains to be seen whether the arguments raised in the post-hearing closing
brief, about the ways tribal fishing rights can inform the interpretation and
enforcement of California public trust law, will be accepted and relied upon by
the State Water Board.
E. Māori Rights to Speak for the Whanganui River in New Zealand
The fifth and final case study illustrates the ways in which the international
indigenous rights law can serve as a catalyst to the adoption of national law to
recognize indigenous claims to rivers and fisheries, and the ways in which such
national legislation can also fall short of the indigenous rights guaranteed in such
international indigenous law.
The Whanganui River in New Zealand is located on the North Island and
stretches for 290 kilometers Mount Tongariro flowing southwest to Tasman Sea
on the coast.133 The Māori indigenous people of New Zealand have a deep and
longstanding connection to the water and fisheries of the Whanganui River.134
As Professors Toni Collins and Shea Esterling at the University of Canterbury
Law School (in New Zealand) detailed in their 2019 article Fluid Personality:
Indigenous Rights and the Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement)
Act of 2017 in Aotearoa New Zealand:
Prior to the arrival of Europeans, areas along the River were some
of the most densely populated by Māori. A number of iwi (Māori
tribes) had authority over the various areas along the River where they
lived, depending upon it for their very existence. After the arrival of
the Pākehā (Europeans/settlers) and the signing of the Te Teriti o
Waitangi (‘Treaty of Waitangi’) in 1840, Pākehā understood that
ownership of the River was no longer vested in the Whanganui iwi.

132

Id. at 4–5.
See Toni Collins & Shea Esterling, Fluid Personality: Indigenous Rights and the Te Awa Tupua
(Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 in Aotearoa New Zealand, 20 MELB. J. INT’L L. 197, 199 (2019).
134
See generally id.
133
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However, Whanganui iwi never relinquished their rights to the River
and have asserted their claims since 1873.135
....
[T]he Whanganui iwi live by the principle of kaitiakitanga (obligation
to nurture and care). They hold a deep respect for the nature as they
consider it to be their tupuna (ancestor) and as part of this relationship
they are responsible for its care and protection. This principle of
kaitiakitanga flows from the Māori understanding that the
environment is part of their broader family. They refer to this as
whanaungatanga (kinship) which encompasses the relationships
between people living and those who have passed on, the environment
and the spiritual world.136

In 2017, New Zealand enacted the Whanganui River Claims Settlement Act
(also known as the Te Awa Tupua Act).137 New Zealand’s adoption of the 2017
Whanganui River Claims Settlement Act was prompted, in part, by efforts to
bring New Zealand into compliance with the 2007 U.N. Declaration.138 Among
other things, this legislation contained provisions in which the government of
New Zealand offered an extensive apology to the Māori related to historical
dealings concerning the Whanganui River, granted the Whanganui River legal
personality, and designated the Māori (referred to as the iwi or hapū of the
Whanganui) as trustees entitled to speak for and sue on behalf of the Whanganui
River.139 Alongside these more innovative provisions, however, as discussed
below, there are also countervailing provisions in the Whanganui River Claims
Settlement Act that limit what constitutes the “river” for purposes of the Māori’s
trustee rights.
In terms of the apologies offered by the government of New Zealand,
Sections 69 and 70 of the Whanganui River Claims Settlement Act state:
(8) The Crown acknowledges that it has failed to recognise, respect,
and protect the special relationship of the iwi and the hapū of
Whanganui with the Whanganui River. . . . (16) The Crown
acknowledges that the diversion of the headwaters of the Whanganui
River for the Tongariro Power Development scheme . . . (b) has had
an adverse effect on the cultural and spiritual values of Whanganui

135

Id. at 199.
Id. at 208.
137
See Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 (N.Z.).
138
See Collins & Esterling, supra note 133, at 210. See generally Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples supra note 69.
139
See Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017, § 20 (N.Z.).
136
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iwi; and (c) has caused distress and remains a significant grievance for
Whanganui Iwi.140
....
The Crown deeply regrets that it undermined the ability of the
Whanganui Iwi to exercise their customary rights and responsibilities
in respect of the Whanganui River, and consequently the expression of
their mana. The Crown further regrets that this compromised the
physical, cultural, and spiritual well-being of the iwi and hapū of
Whanganui Iwi. (e) The Crown recognises that for generations the iwi
and hapū of Whanganui have tirelessly pursued justice in respect of
the Whanganui River. The Crown recognises and sincerely regrets the
opportunities it has missed, until now, to adequately address those
grievances.141

Section 7 of the Whanganui River Claims Settlement Act defines the
Whanganui River to include:
(a) the body of water known as the Whanganui River that flows
continuously or intermittently from its headwaters to the mouth of the
Whanganui River on the Tasman Sea and is located within the
Whanganui River catchment; and (b) all tributaries, streams, and other
natural watercourse that flow continuously or intermittently into the
body of water described in paragraph (a) and are located within the
Whanganui River catchment[.]142

Section 7 of the Whanganui River Claims Settlement Act defines the term
“hapu of Whanganui iwi” as iwi and hapū with interests in the Whanganui
River.143
Section 13 of the Whanganui River Claims Settlement Act defines the term
“Tupu ate Kawa” to mean:
[T]he intrinsic values that represent the essence of Te Awa Tupua,
namely—
Ko Te Kawa Tuatahi (a) Kto et Awa te mātāpuna o te ora: the River is
the source of spiritual and physical sustenance: Te Awa Tupua is a
spiritual and physical entity that supports and sustains both the life and

140
141
142
143

Id. § 69.
Id. § 70.
Id. § 7.
See id.
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natural resources within the Whanganui River and the health and wellbeing of the iwi, hapū, and other communities of the River.144

Section 18 of the Whanganui River Claims Settlement Act provides that the
purpose of the Te Pou Tupua (the office of the Māori people) is “to be the human
face of Te Awa Tupua and act in the name of Te Awa Tupua” and that the
functions of the Te Pou Tupua include “to act and speak for and on behalf of Te
Awa Tupua” and “to promote and protect the health and well-being of Te Awa
Tupua.”145
Collectively, Sections 7, 12, 13, and 18 of the Whanganui River Claims
Settlement Act suggest that the Māori will have a meaningful substantive role in
how the waters and fisheries of the Whanganui River will be managed.146
However, Sections 16 and 66 of the Act suggest otherwise.147
Section 16 of the Act clarifies:
Limits to the effect of this Act and deed of settlement . . . Unless
expressly provided for by or under this Act, nothing in this Act— (a)
limits any existing private property rights in the Whanganui River; or
(b) creates, limits, transfers, extinguishes, or otherwise affects any
rights to, or interest in, water; or (c) creates, limits, transfers,
extinguishes, or otherwise affect any rights to, or interests in, wildlife,
fish, aquatic life, seaweeds, or plants.148

Section 66 of the Act then clarifies that, in regard to fisheries:
Co-ordination of fisheries in Whanganui River catchment . . . As soon
as practicable after the settlement date, the groups and organisations
referred to in subsection (2) must establish a representative group (the
fisheries co-ordination group) to— . . . (b) provide a forum for the iwi
with interests in the Whanganui River to contribute to the protection,
management, and sustainable utilisation of fisheries and fish habitat
managed in the Whanganui River.149

Pursuant to Sections 16 and 66 of the Act, it therefore appears that the
Māori’s interest and trustee relationship to the Whanganui River does not extend
to limits on the diversion of river waters or the conservation of river fish, but

144
145
146
147
148
149

Id. § 13.
Id. §§ 18–19.
See id. §§ 7, 12–13, 18.
See id. §§ 16, 66.
Id. § 16 (emphasis added).
Id. § 66 (emphasis added).
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instead is limited to participation in a “forum” to “contribute” to the protection
and management of fisheries and fish habitat.150
As Professors Toni Collins and Shea Esterling note:
Yet arguably, the most significant limitation on its powers is that is
does not own the water that is inextricably part of the River. The
vesting of parts of the riverbed in Te Awa Tupua does not create or
transfer a proprietary interest in the water because, under common law,
water is incapable of being owned. Therefore, even though Te Awa
Tupua comprises the Whanganui River, its rights of ownership are
limited to only parts of the riverbed and not the water. An example of
this anomaly is that there is no requirement for consent to be obtained
from Te Awa Tupua to use the water.151
....
Water is the crucial element of a river because without water, there is
only a dry channel of land. Under the Te Awa Tupua Act, Te Awa
Tupua does not have proprietary rights to the water, which creates an
anomaly because it does not own the very aspect of the River that
makes it a river: the water. It is like saying that a natural person owns
his or her skin, but not his or her blood — the life-giving substance.152
....
Consequently, the Act reflects the gloss but not the substance of human
rights; its bark without its bite.153

When viewed comprehensively, the 2017 Whanganui River Claims
Settlement Act contains some basic contradictions. On the one hand, it
recognizes the unique cultural relationship of the Māori to the Whanganui River
and designates the Māori as trustee to speak and sue on behalf of the river. On
the other hand, the Act provides the Māori with no substantive rights as to how
the waters and fisheries of the Whanganui River are managed.
II. CONCLUSION: THE INDIGENOUS RIGHT TO INSTREAM WATER
The experiences of the Yakima people at Celilo Falls, the Ainu people on
the Saru River, the Lummi people on the Nooksack River, the Karuk people on
Stanshaw Creek, and the Māori people on the Whanganui River have practical

150
151
152
153

See id. §§ 16, 66.
Collins & Esterling, supra note 133, at 202 (citation omitted).
Id. at 216.
Id. at 217.
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implications for efforts to establish and build the foundations of an enforceable
right to keep water instream for fisheries. These practical implications take many
forms.
First, there is the effort to ground the right to instream flows for fisheries in
sources of international human rights law. In the preceding analysis, we
examined the Ainu’s reliance (in Japan) on protections in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted by the U.N. General Assembly
in 1966,154 the Cucapá’s reliance (in Mexico) on protections in the 1989
Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples adopted by the International
Labor Organization,155 and the Māori’s reliance (in New Zealand) on the 2007
U.N. Declaration.156 The list of sources of international indigenous rights law
that lends support to the right to maintain instream flows for fisheries is more
extensive than these three sources.
As the late Professor David Getches of the University of Colorado School of
Law noted in his article Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Water under
International Norms, other sources of supportive international law include the
1977 Declaration of Principles for the Defense of Indigenous Nations and People
in the Western Hemisphere (1977 Western Hemisphere Indigenous
Declaration)157 and the 2003 Indigenous Peoples Water Declaration.158 Section
11 of the 1977 Western Hemisphere Indigenous Declaration (adopted at the
1977 Non-Governmental Organization Conference on Discrimination Against
Indigenous Populations in Geneva, Switzerland) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any state to make or permit any action or course
of conduct with respect to the territories of an indigenous nation or
group which will directly or indirectly result in the destruction or
deterioration of an indigenous nation or group through the effects of
pollution of earth, air, water, or which in any other way depletes,
displaces or destroys any natural resources or other resource under the
domination of, or vital to the livelihood of an indigenous nation or
group.159

154

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
Getches, supra note 10, at 262.
156
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 69.
157
Getches, supra note 10, at 271.
158
Id. at 287.
159
INT’L INDIAN TREATY COUNCIL, DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE INDIGENOUS
NATIONS AND PEOPLES OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 26 (1977), at https://ipdpowwow.org/%201977_
conference%20ITTC%20Report%20copy.pdf.
155
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Principle 11 of the 2003 Indigenous Peoples Water Declaration (adopted at
the Third World Water Forum in Japan) provides: “Self-determination includes
the practice of our cultural and spiritual relationships with water, and the
exercise of authority to govern use, manage, regulate, recover, conserve,
enhance and renew our water sources, without interference.”160
In regard to indigenous rights to fish and water recognized under
international law, the experience of the Ainu people on the Saru River in Japan
also suggests that when the cultural heritage and sacred religious ceremonies of
indigenous people are on the line, providing monetary compensation for
riverside lands taken and fishing income lost may not be sufficient.161 To provide
meaningful protection of such indigenous rights to fish and water, international
law may need to be interpreted or amended to provide for a right to injunctive
relief to preserve the underlying resources from destruction. Similarly, as the
experience with the Māori people and the Whanganui River in New Zealand
reveals, passing domestic legislation that recognizes the symbolic and cultural
connections between indigenous groups and rivers, but that fails to provide
indigenous groups with substantive rights to ensure there is adequate instream
flows to preserve the fisheries in such rivers, may not satisfy what international
indigenous rights law requires.162
Second, in addition to revealing the ways that instream rights can be
grounded directly in international indigenous rights, these experiences also
suggest how the indigenous relationship to fish and water can affect the ways
we understand and implement other domestic non-indigenous sources of law.
For example, under environmental impact assessment laws such as the
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)163 and the federal National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),164 agencies are required to consider
alternatives to avoid or reduce significant adverse environmental impacts. When
injury to the cultural heritage of indigenous salmon-dependent people is
understood as an “environmental impact” separate and distinct from the
biological impact of projects on salmon stocks, we see how the indigenous right
to fish and water can factor into traditional environmental impact assessment

160
Indigenous Peoples Kyoto Water Declaration, Third World Water Forum, Kyoto, Japan, princ. 11
(Mar. 2003), at https://www.activeremedy.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/indigenous_peoples_kyoto_water_
declaration_2003.pdf.
161
Levin, supra note 43, at 425, 428.
162
Collins & Esterling, supra note 133, at 207, 216, 218.
163
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002 (Deering 1970).
164
42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
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laws.165 Had NEPA been in force at the time The Dalles Dam was being
considered, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers might have been legally required
to give more serious consideration to the Yakima proposal to relocate the dam a
few miles upstream to avoid the significant adverse tribal culture impacts that
would be caused by the loss of Celilo Falls.166
As another example, in regard to domestic instream flow standards set by
states for particular waterways, the Lummi Nation claims concerning the
Nooksack River in the State of Washington reveal that there has been a problem
with compliance.167 Instream flow standards protective of salmon may be set,
but some states (like the State of Washington) have demonstrated an
unwillingness to effectively enforce such standards. The experience with the
Lummi on the Nooksack River suggests that the federal government’s defense
of tribal fishing rights may be a mechanism to strengthen state enforcement of
existing instream flow standards.168
In terms of the interplay between public trust law and indigenous rights, as
noted in the Introduction to this Article, salmon are recognized as a public trust
resource under California public trust law.169 The experience of the Karuk
Tribe’s efforts to reduce diversions on California’s Stanshaw Creek reveals the
ways that indigenous rights to fish and water can overlay and inform public trust
law.170 That is, when the public trust resources also happen to be indigenous
resources, perhaps such public trust resources are properly entitled to a
heightened level of protection under public trust law.171
Lastly, when it comes to national laws to protect indigenous rights to
fisheries, we see that national governments may often be willing to prevent
encroachment on such indigenous rights by private parties and non-federal
governments, but are often willing to allow such encroachment by the federal
government itself. This was illustrated by the federal government’s willingness
to proceed with construction of The Dallas Dam on the Columbia River despite
the fact that the dam would result in the inundation and destruction of the sacred
Celilo Falls fishing site.

165
166
167

PUB. RES. § 21002; 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
BARBER, supra note 7, at 90.
Letter from Clifford Cultee, Chairman, Lummi Indian Business Council to Ken Salazar, supra note 80,

at 2.
168
169
170
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Id. at 2–4.
Id. at 1, 4.
Brief for Karuk Tribe & Klamath Riverkeeper, supra note 117, at 9.
Id. at 5, 6, 11.
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Perhaps one of the greatest values of framing instream rights as indigenous
rights (under both domestic and international law) is that it makes the question
of instream flow less abstract. It reframes instream flow as something that
directly impacts not just people in general but particular persons whose ethnic
identity is intimately linked to river waters and fisheries. As Section 18 of New
Zealand’s 2017 Te Awa Tupua Act explains, the indigenous people (Te Pou
Tupua) with deep connections to the river are recognized as “the human face of
Te Awa Tupua” (the Whanganui River).172 This human face reminds us that
instream flows are not just about preserving fish stocks and riverine ecosystems.
At times, they are also about preserving cultures and civilizations.
POSTSCRIPT
As this Article was being finalized for publication in August 2020, an
important new development occurred in terms of Ainu claims to fisheries and
water in Japan discussed above in Section I.B. This postscript provides an
overview of this recent development.
On August 7, 2020, a lawsuit was filed against the Japanese federal
government and the Hokkaido regional government by a group of ethnic Ainu
people living in the town of Uraboro in Hokkaido.173 The lawsuit, filed in
Sapporo District Court, seeks judicial recognition of the Ainu’s right to fish for
salmon in the inland waters of the Uraboro-Toakachi River estuary.174
Although a comprehensive review of the claims in the lawsuit is beyond the
scope of this postscript, the plaintiffs’ claims focus on provisions in the federal
Fisheries Resources Protection Act and federal Fishery Act, and on provisions
in the Hokkaido Inland Fisheries Coordination Regulations that generally
prohibit the Ainu from salmon fishing in inland waters, and that only provided
for relief from such prohibition pursuant to a limited permission that may be
granted by the Hokkaido regional government for salmon fishing essential for
“ceremonial” practices.175 The August 7, 2020 document filed with the Sapporo
District Court alleges that the provisions under these laws were violative of
Japan’s obligations to the Ainu under international law as set forth in the 2007
U.N. Declaration.176

172

Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017, § 18 (N.Z.).
Filing by Ainu Plaintiffs (Purpose of the Request) with Sapporo District Court (August 7, 2020, English
translation on file with Paul Stanton Kibel).
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Id.
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Id. at 8.
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Id. at 36–40,
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According the August 7, 2020 lawsuit:
Plaintiffs are a newly reunited community of the former Ainu groups
that existed in the Basin in question, and they have inherited the fishing
rights of the former Ainu groups that were unlawfully deprived and
effectively unable to exercise their rights.
As mentioned above, it is an international trend for indigenous groups
to regain the rights that had been taken away from them by the states
that were the powers that be, as well as for the state that took away the
rights from indigenous peoples to be seen as obligated to restore the
rights of this group.
In September 2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, which
the Japanese government endorsed. The Declaration… “recognizes
that indigenous peoples have been historically wronged as a result of,
inter alia, colonization and deprivation of their lands, territories and
resources.”177
....
Specifically defined as indigenous peoples’ rights, such as the “right
to self-determination” (Article 3), the right to land and natural
resources is identified as an [indigenous] peoples’ right in Article 26.
Article 26(1) states that “Indigenous peoples shall have the right to the
land, territory, or territory traditionally owned, occupied, or otherwise
used or acquired by them and natural resources” and paragraph 2 states
that they “shall have the right to own, use, develop and manage” these
lands and resources. And paragraph 3 states that “the State shall give
legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and
resources.”
The rights of indigenous peoples enshrined in the Declaration are
rights that have been recognized as a matter of judicial precedent in
countries around the world (especially in relation to the relationship
between the powerful countries and indigenous peoples) and that have
been exercised in practice in North America and elsewhere. Therefore,
the rights of the United Nations Declaration on the [] Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, in particular Article 26(1), can be considered as
customary international law[.]178

177
Filing by Ainu Plaintiffs (Purpose of the Request) with Sapporo District Court (August 7, 2020, English
translation on file with author) 1, 36–38 (citations omitted).
178
Id. at 38–39.
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On this basis, the August 7, 2020 lawsuit alleged:
The [2007 United Nations Declaration] in this case indicates that the
plaintiffs have the right to harvest, develop (process) and manage the
salmon resources of the Tokachi River . . . The Government of Japan
(defendant country) has an international obligation to recognize and
protect the rights of the plaintiffs in the Tokachi River.179

In a law review article in The International Journal of Human Rights, titled
An Examination of Arguments Over the Ainu Policy Promotion Act of Japan
Based on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, Professor
Yuko Osakada (of Chukyo University School of Law in Japan) notes that the
Japanese government may respond to the August 2020 Ainu lawsuit by alleging
that the plaintiffs lack standing to assert collective rights because they are not
part of an appropriate representative organization.180 Professor Osakada writes:
[T]he Japanese government, which is responsible for the previous
assimilation policies, should not deny the Ainu’s collective rights
based on the lack of a representative organization. Rather, various
types of support, including financial ones, should be given to make it
possible for the Ainu people to establish their own representative
organisation. Meanwhile, the Raporo Ainu Nation insists that they
took over aboriginal rights from their ancestors who lived in the Ainu
villages, therefore they should be considered as holders of collective
rights to fish salmon. Taking into account their claim, it could be said
that several local Ainu groups should be regarded as holders of
collective rights until the Ainu united to establish a common
representative organisation for themselves. This approach, however, is
merely one of the possible ways and any decision about their
representative organisation should be made by the Ainu themselves,
as required by Article 18 of the UN Declaration.181

As Professor Osakada’s comments suggest, the August 2020 lawsuit filed
by the Ainu will test whether Japan is prepared to acknowledge and comply with
international human rights obligations set forth in the 2007 United Nations
Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples, or whether Japan will instead
pursue arguments to try to evade such obligations and compliance.182
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